Tag: SME

Padi UMKM

When I first designed what later became Padi UMKM, I did not do it in a boardroom. I did it at home, during long months of WFH in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic. I drew the system on papers spread on the floor. At that time, my head was full of ideas about ecosystems, complexity theory, and complexity economics. I was not thinking about building another digital platform. I was thinking about how economic coordination itself breaks down under systemic shock, and how new coordination patterns might emerge when old ones collapse. In that sense, Padi UMKM was born less from a product mindset than from an ecosystem mindset, with complexity theory consciously in the background.

When the pandemic hit, what collapsed was not only the economy. What collapsed was the coordination logic of the economy. Supply chains broke, demand evaporated, SMEs lost access to markets, and institutions discovered that their standard operating procedures were designed for stability, not for systemic disruption. Many organisations reacted by accelerating digital projects, launching platforms, and optimising internal processes. That helped, but it did not address the deeper problem. The economic ecosystem itself had lost its organising structure. Actors that were rational in isolation could no longer produce coherent outcomes collectively. This is how complex systems behave under stress: when established coordination patterns fail, local rationality no longer aggregates into systemic order.

Padi UMKM did not start as a brilliant digital product idea. It started as a response to a coordination failure across a fragmented system of SOEs, SMEs, banks, regulators, ministries, and development agencies. All were acting with good intentions, yet through incompatible logics, timelines, and mandates. The system was not short of initiatives; it was short of coherence. In complexity terms, the economy had been pushed far from equilibrium, and the challenge was not optimisation but reorganisation. What was needed was not another tool, but a new pattern of interaction among heterogeneous agents.

The real innovation of Padi UMKM was therefore not the platform. The platform was the easy part. The digital workforce of Telkom Group can design platforms; that is an operational capability. The platform was necessary, and it became the core infrastructure of the ecosystem, but it was not the breakthrough. The breakthrough was the deliberate redefinition of roles within the economic system. SOEs must reposition their procurement operation into a capability of creating new market, i.e. an SME-based market structure. SMEs were not framed as beneficiaries of aid, but as economic agents that could be structurally integrated into formal procurement and value creation. Banks and financial institutions were not treated merely as lenders, but as part of an enabling architecture that combined financing with capability development and pathways to export. What changed was not a feature set. What changed was the pattern of interaction between economic actors.

The formal launching of Padi UMKM itself was not initiated by Telkom or by the Ministry of SOEs. It was planned within the nationwide BBI (Bangga Buatan Indonesia) program, because the central government needed a real, executable instrument to accelerate domestic economic circulation under crisis. Telkom showed a commitment to develop the platform, even though it was still imperfect at that time. The urgency was national, not corporate. This matters, because it positioned Padi UMKM from the beginning not as a corporate product launch, but as a systemic intervention embedded in a national recovery narrative. The early external promotion of Padi UMKM, beyond the internal SOE environment, was also driven by the BBI program. Over time, almost by systemic selection rather than by design, Padi UMKM became the de facto e-commerce infrastructure for BBI, as other platforms could not fit the specific institutional and ecosystemic roles required by the program.

From the beginning, we made a counterintuitive choice in the way the system was governed. Telkom deliberately limited its role to being the product and platform owner. The ecosystem itself was not branded as Telkom’s program. The community was symbolically owned by the Ministry of SOEs and by SOEs collectively. Even the name Padi UMKM did not originate from Telkom. This was not a political compromise; it was a strategic design choice grounded in complexity thinking. In complex systems, ecosystems tend to collapse when one actor over-claims ownership. When the platform owner also claims to own the ecosystem, other actors reduce their commitment, hedge their participation, or quietly resist. By stepping back from symbolic ownership, Telkom created space for other institutions to step forward. The platform provided the infrastructure, but the legitimacy of the ecosystem was deliberately distributed across actors.

At some point, something structurally interesting happened. The initiative crossed a threshold where no single actor could kill it anymore. The CEO of Telkom could not simply shut it down because the ecosystem had become institutionally embedded beyond Telkom. The Minister of SOEs could not dismantle it easily because it had become part of the official narrative of national economic recovery. The President could not disown it because it had been publicly positioned as a success story through BBI, PEN, and related programs. This was not political theatre. This was the moment when the system acquired path dependence. Once an initiative becomes embedded across multiple layers of institutional narrative and governance, it ceases to be a project and becomes part of the system itself. At that point, you are no longer managing a prograe. You are dealing with a living economic structure.

Value in Padi UMKM did not come from transactions alone. It emerged from the coupling of multiple layers of interaction. Transactions between SOEs and SMEs were reinforced by access to credit, by certification mechanisms that enabled formal participation, by development programmes that upgraded SME capabilities, and by pathways to export markets. None of these elements, on their own, would have been transformative. The transformation emerged from their interaction. This is how complex economies create value: not through linear pipelines, but through ecosystems in which different forms of capital, i.e. financial, institutional, social, and operational, reinforce one another over time.

Internally in Telkom, there was a structural separation of roles that proved critical. The Digital Business Directorate (DDB) operated at the product and business level. Its logic was operational: build, run, scale, monetise, and maintain the platform. Even as the platform owner and economic keystone, it remained only one agent within the broader ecosystem. In parallel, the Synergy Subdirectorate under the Strategic Portfolio Directorate worked at the ecosystem level. This role was not about features, roadmaps, or KPIs. It was about sensing emergent patterns of collaboration, mediating conflicts between institutions, and navigating collisions between policy signals and organisational incentives. In the early phase, the Synergy team also played a foundational role in organising cross-SOE agreements, preparing the multi-actor launch, embedding Padi UMKM within the BBI program, and connecting it with multiple SME build-up initiatives involving the Ministry of SMEs, the Ministry of Trade, and other institutions. This work was not linear project management; it was ecosystem orchestration under uncertainty.

In Indonesia’s context, the interaction between SOEs, SMEs, banks, and regulators is not merely complex; it is quasi-chaotic. Mandates overlap, incentives conflict, and policies evolve at different speeds and under different political pressures. In such an environment, precise prediction is an illusion. What becomes possible instead is navigation: sensing where constructive patterns of emergence are forming, dampening destructive feedback loops before they escalate, and shaping the boundaries within which the ecosystem evolves. This is not classical management. This is leadership under complexity.

As a result of its early success, there was a moment when the government, again through the BBI programme, asked to expand Padi UMKM to cover all government agencies (K/L/PD). On paper, this looked like success, with an enormous projected GMV. In reality, it carried a systemic risk. Full integration into the broader government procurement apparatus would have imposed rigid compliance structures and administrative constraints that could have frozen the adaptive dynamics that made the ecosystem work. The decision to return that expansion to LKPP, while positioning Telkom only as a platform provider for LKPP, was a deliberate choice to preserve modularity and flexibility over symbolic scale. In complex systems, scale without adaptability is not growth; it is fragility disguised as success.

What this experience ultimately taught us is uncomfortable for traditional management thinking. In complex economic ecosystems, you cannot engineer outcomes. You can only design conditions: boundaries, incentives, roles, and narratives that make constructive emergence more likely than destructive collapse. The platform mattered. The technology mattered. But what mattered more was the humility to accept that once an ecosystem becomes alive, you are no longer the architect standing outside the system. You are one of the agents operating within it.

The strategic lesson for C-level leadership is this. In times of systemic disruption, competitive advantage no longer lies primarily in having the most sophisticated product or the fastest execution. It lies in the capability to shape interaction spaces across institutions, sectors, and policy domains. Leadership shifts from control to stewardship. Strategy shifts from optimisation to navigation. And success is no longer measured only by ownership, but by whether the system you helped catalyse can survive, adapt, and continue to create value even when you step back.

That, ultimately, is what Padi UMKM represents. Not a digital product success story, but a case of how leadership, strategy, and technology can be recomposed to operate effectively in a complex, adaptive economy under crisis. It is an ecosystem in motion. It is Synergy in action.

Note: This is a copy of my post at Complexity Center [LINK] and an update of my initial story about Padi UMKM written 5 years ago [LINK].

MSME Ecosystem

Since 2016 I have a new role in Telkom Indonesia as the AVP (now Project Leader) of the Industry Synergy. The role of Synergy Department is simply developing the capabilities (mainly digital capabilities) and expanding opportunities of Telkom Group by maximising the collaboration with the industry. As a government policy at that time, the collaborations are prioritised with the state-owned companies (BUMN) in Indonesia. More than three years have passed then. We have changed the Ministry of BUMN, Telkom’s CEO, Telkom’s BOD in charge of Synergy programs, SVP and VP of Synergy, etc. But we are still developing our paradigm of digital synergy, i.e. developing digitally supported economic ecosystems in different sectors.

Using a metaphor from the environment, an innovation ecosystems consists of interdependent parties with different or often competing objectives and concerns, living and growing together in a common digital space, unified using one platform or more to enable them to live better and grow faster. Co-creation, collaboration, and competition are some key activities of the innovation ecosystems.

Last year, the new Minister of BUMN has addressed Telkom Indonesia to develop five ecosystems: Tourism, Agriculture, Logistics, Education, and Healthcare. We even hired a prominent global consultant to help us design the ecosystem. But this February, I requested an approval from the uplinks to add another ecosystem: the MSME ecosystem, to support non-digital micro, small, and medium business enterprises in digital way.

Previously we have had a program called RKB to develop the capability of SMEs in Indonesia. RKBs (BUMN’s creative house) have been established in 245 of 514 cities and regencies in Indonesia. In RKB, BUMNs provide training, consulting, and other facilities to leverage the capabilities of the SMEs in three product categories: culinary, craft, and fashion. But RKBs have failed to attract the SMEs since they do not really improve the sales of the SME products. An MSME ecosystem, on the contrary, should start with MSME commercialisation in mind.

We started with a small design by utilising a multichannel marketing application called SAKOO as our first platform. In March, many cities and locations in Indonesia (and other part of the world) are locked down (until the time I’m writing this post, btw) due to COVID-19 pandemic. We found some contexts for the usecase of the platform. To generate market, we will use BUMNs (and public, using campaigns supported by BUMNs) to create demands for the MSME market. BUMNs may buy the products of the MSMEs for their need, or as an aid to support the communities or health facilities in. Surely we first tried it with Telkom. Telkom has started purchasing MSMEs products using this platform, and has also sent support to communities in Depok.

The Minister of BUMN has a new expert staff: Ms Loto S Ginting — a smart lady working previously as a Director in the Ministry of Finance, managing sovereign bond. Now she advises the Minister of BUMN in the issues of Finance and MSME development. Our BUMN Law (UU 19/2003) mentions indeed that the strategic roles of the BUMNs include providing services for public, counterweight for private business, and support to develop small business and co-operatives. We approached her to discuss this first stage of MSME Ecosystem development program. She enthusiastically accepted the program. In addition, she improve the plan to add B2B transaction facility to the first stage of the program. The transaction data from B2B and B2C are further combined with data taken from e-Procurement systems of the BUMNs to make a dashboard to ensure the increase absorption of MSMEs products and services by the BUMNs. She calls this program PADI UMKM, stands for Pasar Digital UMKM / MSME Digital Market.

Meanwhile, the Covid-19 pandemic has brought the nation into an economic crisis. To survive, MSMEs and their employees need the public involvement. The Minister addressed to rush the MSME platform development. We work with our startup partners: Anchanto, Tees, Payfast, etc to enrich PADI UMKM platform with wider multichannel, logistics management, B2B capability, financing facility, etc. We need to finish it next month (June), so we can start the transaction on July. Eight BUMNs have been selected for pilot project. A new PMO has been assigned to finish this project.

It still felt like a miracle that everything was only in ideation last February, and all activities are carried out during lockdown periods, with all meetings held using vicon, and coordination using whatsapp. Let’s hope we can finish it on June, to support more prosperous small business in Indonesia in long term, or at least, for now, just to have them survive these crises..

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